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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 Defendant Robert Holifield pled guilty in 1994 to five 
counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Supp. V 
1993).  The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court 
acted within its discretion in its application of the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines.  We will affirm. 
 I. 
 From March 13, 1992, to June 12, 1992, Holifield 
engaged in a wire fraud scheme in the Middle and Western 
Districts of Pennsylvania.  Holifield telephoned various persons, 
falsely representing himself to be a corporate officer of Diamond 
Marketing Company, V.I.P. Promotions, and other companies.  After 
advising them they had won prizes through a sweepstakes drawing, 
Holifield told them that it was necessary to pay an advance fee 
  
to cover expenses and taxes on the prize.  He then instructed 
them to wire the money to Western Union offices in Pennsylvania 
and Georgia to persons that he claimed were company associates.  
The scheme caused losses to five individuals totaling more than 
$25,000. 
 Two years earlier, from December 1, 1989, through 
November 1, 1990, Holifield engaged in a similar scheme in the 
Northern District of Georgia, this time purportedly as a salesman 
for International Marketers, Incorporated.  Holifield also 
trained others to be salespersons for IMI.  Three victims in this 
scheme lost a total of $2,700.  The cases from the Northern 
District of Georgia and the Middle District of Pennsylvania were 
transferred to the Western District of Pennsylvania under Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 20 and were consolidated for purposes 
of disposition ("the Pennsylvania charges"). 
 At the time the Pennsylvania charges were filed, 
Holifield was serving a 21-month sentence for another wire fraud 
scheme in which he posed as an Internal Revenue Service agent 
during February 1993.  That charge was filed in the District of 
Colorado, and Holifield pled guilty in August 1993. 
 As we have noted, Holifield later pled guilty to five 
counts of wire fraud in the Western District of Pennsylvania.  
The guideline range for each count was 15-21 months imprisonment.  
He was sentenced to 15 months on each count, each to run 
concurrently and also concurrently with the remaining time on the 
Colorado sentence, which was four months. 
  
 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231 (1988).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291 (1988).  Our review of the construction of the Sentencing 
Guidelines is plenary.  United States v. Nottingham, 898 F.2d 
390, 392 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 II. 
 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3584 (1988), a sentencing court is 
permitted to order a defendant's sentence to run either 
concurrently or consecutively to another sentence imposed at the 
same time or to an earlier, undischarged term of imprisonment.  
That discretion is subject to § 5G1.3 of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines, which was promulgated in response to the 
statutory duty imposed upon the Sentencing Commission to include 
in the guidelines "a determination whether multiple sentences to 
terms of imprisonment should be ordered to run concurrently or 
consecutively."  28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1)(D) (1988). 
 The government and Holifield apparently agree that § 
5G1.3(c) governs this dispute.1  Subsection (c) provides that 
"the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run 
consecutively to the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to 
the extent necessary to achieve a reasonable incremental 
                     
1
.  Subsection (a) of § 5G1.3 requires consecutive sentences when 
the sentence is for a crime committed while the defendant was 
serving a term of imprisonment, or after sentencing for, but 
before commencing service of, such term of imprisonment.  
Subsection (b) applies when subsection (a) does not apply, and 
calls for concurrent sentences when the undischarged term of 
imprisonment resulted from an offense that has been fully taken 
into account in the determination of the offense level for the 
instant offense. 
  
punishment for the instant offense."  U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) (Policy 
Statement) (emphasis added).2  The Commentary's Application Note 
to subsection (c) states that a consecutive sentence is not 
required when reasonable incremental punishment can be achieved 
through the use of a concurrent sentence.  The note then explains 
what is meant by "reasonable incremental punishment": 
 To the extent practicable, the court should 
consider a reasonable incremental penalty to 
be a sentence for the instant offense that 
results in a combined sentence of 
imprisonment that approximates the total 
punishment that would have been imposed under 
§ 5G1.2 (Sentencing on Multiple Counts of 
Conviction) had all of the offenses been 
federal offenses for which sentences were 
being imposed at the same time. 
 
Id. § 5G1.3 (Commentary).3 
                     
2
.  The policy statements and commentary contained in the 
guidelines are binding on the federal courts.  See, e.g., Stinson 
v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1919 (1993) (commentary "must 
be given 'controlling weight unless . . . plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent'" with the guidelines); Williams v. United States, 
503 U.S. 193, 201 (1992) (policy statement serves as "an 
authoritative guide to the meaning of the applicable Guideline"). 
3
.  The Commission has provided illustrations of how § 5G1.3 is 
to work.  In one illustration a guideline range for the instant 
federal offense is 24-30 months.  The court determines that a 
total punishment of 36 months would appropriately reflect the 
instant federal offense and the offense resulting in the 
undischarged term of imprisonment.  The undischarged sentence is 
an indeterminate term of imprisonment with a 60-month maximum, of 
which 10 months have been served by the defendant.  In that case, 
according to the illustration, a sentence of 26 months 
imprisonment, to be served concurrently with the undischarged 
sentence, "would (1) be within the guideline range for the 
instant federal offense, and (2) achieve an appropriate total 
punishment (36 months)."  U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 (Illustration A). 
  
 III. 
 Holifield argued, and the district court apparently 
agreed, that had the sentences on the Pennsylvania and Colorado 
charges been imposed at the same time, the maximum sentence he 
could have received would have been 24 months.  At the time 
Holifield was sentenced on the Pennsylvania charges, he had 
served 17 of the 21 months on the Colorado offense.  Thus he 
argued that § 5G1.3 required that his sentence on the 
Pennsylvania charges run no more than seven months and 
concurrently with his undischarged sentence, or three months and 
consecutively to the remaining four months of his undischarged 
sentence.  In either case, Holifield contended that § 5G1.3 
required that he serve no more total time than he would have 
served had he been sentenced on all the offenses at the same time 
(24 months).  In addition, Holifield argued that any sentence 
resulting in a greater total punishment was an upward departure 
from the guidelines and required prior notice in accordance with 
Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 138-39 (1991).  As we have 
noted, the district court disagreed and Holifield raises the same 
issues on appeal. 
 The government responds that Congress intended to vest 
district court judges with discretion to run sentences 
concurrently or consecutively.  Although the government concedes 
§ 5G1.3 must be considered by the district court, it claims that 
a strict application of that section's methodology is not 
necessary. 
 A. 
  
 Section 5G1.3 provides guidance in determining whether 
to run a sentence concurrently or consecutively.  While it 
appears to permit a downward departure from the applicable 
guideline range to meet its objectives, it does not create a 
sentencing scheme in itself nor does it require a downward 
departure.  The Commentary to § 5G1.3 states: 
  Additionally, this methodology does not, 
itself, require the court to depart from the 
guideline range established for the instant 
federal offense.  Rather, this methodology is 
meant to assist the court in determining the 
appropriate sentence (e.g., the appropriate 
point within the applicable guideline range, 
whether to order the sentence to run 
concurrently or consecutively to the 
undischarged term of imprisonment, or whether 
a departure is warranted). 
 
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 (Commentary) (emphasis added). 
 As the final clause in this part of the Commentary 
suggests, sentencing Holifield to less than 15 months to meet the 
general objectives of § 5G1.3 would have been a departure from 
the guideline range.  And although § 5G1.3 would permit a 
departure, the Commentary clearly states that the methodology 
"does not, itself, require the court to depart."4 
 This is also evident in one of the illustrations 
provided by the Sentencing Commission.  In fact, although the 
                     
4
.  Holifield's sentence was within the applicable guideline 
range for the instant offense.  The fact that the sentence 
resulted in a period of incarceration longer than the "total 
punishment" calculated under § 5G1.3 does not make it an upward 
departure.  Thus, Holifield's argument that there was a departure 
requiring notice and cause is without merit.   
  
figures are different, the illustration discusses a sentencing 
situation similar to the one the district court faced here: 
 The applicable guideline range for the 
instant federal offense is 24-30 months.  The 
court determines that a total punishment of 
36 months' imprisonment would appropriately 
reflect the instant federal offense and the 
offense resulting in the undischarged term of 
imprisonment.  The undischarged term of 
imprisonment is an indeterminate sentence 
with a 60-month maximum.  At the time of 
sentencing on the instant federal offense, 
the defendant has served 22 months on the 
undischarged term of imprisonment.  In this 
case, a sentence of 24 months to be served 
concurrently with the remainder of the 
undischarged term of imprisonment would be 
the lowest sentence imposable without 
departure for the instant federal offense. 
 
Id. § 5G1.3 (Illustration D). 
 With no departure from the guidelines, the defendant in 
the illustration would serve a total of 46 months, even though a 
total of 36 months would appropriately reflect the two offenses.  
While departure may be justified in such a circumstance, we 
believe that if departure was required, the Sentencing Commission 
clearly would have said so.5 
                     
5
.  In fact, this position was taken by John Steer, General 
Counsel to the United States Sentencing Commission, in a letter 
cited in Holifield's brief.  Asked about downward departures in 
this circumstance under § 5G1.3, Steer wrote: 
 
 Occasionally, a downward departure may be 
necessary to make this provision work 
properly.  For example, where the defendant 
has been in state custody for a long time, a 
downward departure may be the only feasible 
way to achieve an appropriate total 
punishment, assuming the court wishes to 
employ a departure to achieve the desired 
objective. 
  
 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reached the 
same conclusion in a remarkably similar case.  In United States 
v. Wiley-Dunaway, 40 F.3d 67 (4th Cir. 1994), the defendant 
embezzled $54,883 in West Virginia before her actions were 
discovered.  She fled to the Virgin Islands, where under an 
assumed name she embezzled another $52,279.  She pled guilty in 
the Virgin Islands district court and received a 21-month 
sentence.6 
 After she was sentenced, the defendant was indicted for 
her West Virginia crimes.  She pled guilty in federal court in 
West Virginia and received a 15-month sentence to run consecutive 
to the Virgin Islands federal sentence, which had less than three 
months remaining.  The district court, in sentencing, did not 
address § 5G1.3. 
 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit followed the methodology 
of § 5G1.3(c).  The court noted that the sentencing range for the 
instant offense was 12 to 18 months, and the defendant argued the 
maximum she could have received for the combined offenses was 24 
months.  Subtracting the 21-month sentence she had received for 
(..continued) 
 
Letter from John Steer, General Counsel, United States Sentencing 
Commission, to Tony Garoppolo, Deputy Chief U.S. Probation 
Officer 8 (January 6, 1994) (emphasis added). 
6
.  The defendant also pled guilty to a Virgin Islands 
territorial offense for which she received a 60-month sentence to 
run concurrently with the federal sentence.  At the time of 
sentencing for the West Virginia offenses, she had only four 
months remaining until she became eligible for parole for this 
territorial offense.  United States v. Wiley-Dunaway, 40 F.3d 67, 
69 (4th Cir. 1994). 
  
the Virgin Islands federal offense, the defendant contended she 
could only receive a 3-month "reasonable incremental punishment" 
for the instant offense.  The Fourth Circuit rejected the claim, 
holding that: 
 [T]he minimum range for the instant West 
Virginia offense is 12 months.  Accordingly, 
the minimum sentence to which Wiley-Dunaway 
could have been sentenced under these 
assumptions, without a downward departure, is 
a 12-month sentence to run concurrently with 
the remainder of the term imposed by the 
District of the Virgin Islands, and 
consecutively thereafter. 
Id. at 71.  The court remanded the case to the district court, 
but only because it had not considered § 5G1.3 at the time of 
sentencing.  Id. at 71-72. 
 It is important to note the methodology of § 5G1.3 
vests discretion in the trial judge.  It does not require a 
departure from the guideline range for the instant offense.  
Thus, when a defendant has been in custody for a substantial 
amount of time and the sentencing judge chooses not to depart, 
his total time served may be greater than it would have been had 
he been sentenced for all his crimes at once.  In a letter, John 
Steer, General Counsel to the United States Sentencing 
Commission, indicated that a downward departure may be desirable 
when the increase is simply because of a delay in the defendant's 
trial or sentencing.  See Letter from John Steer, General 
  
Counsel, United States Sentencing Commission, to Tony Garoppolo, 
Deputy Chief U.S. Probation Officer 8-9 (January 6, 1994).  Yet, 
as the Fourth Circuit noted, "While that position has merit, it 
does not dictate the result or require a downward departure 
. . . ."  Wiley-Dunaway, 40 F.3d at 71. 
 In this case, the sentencing court adhered to the 
methodology prescribed by § 5G1.3.  Discussion of the application 
of § 5G1.3 spans fifty pages of the transcript of the sentencing 
hearing, as the court and prosecution and defense counsel 
proceeded step-by-step through the requirements of the guideline.  
See App. at 95-145.  The court determined that § 5G1.3(c) applied 
to this case, not § 5G1.3(b), as defense counsel claimed.  Id. at 
112, 114.  The court also accepted the government's position that 
the instant offenses required a sentence range of 15 to 21 
months.  Id. at 95.  The government and defense then agreed the 
defendant had only four months remaining on his sentence for the 
Colorado offense.  Id. at 97-99, 113-114.  The parties noted it 
was uncertain whether, by combining the instant offenses with the 
Colorado offense, the total sentence would have been a maximum of 
21 or 24 months.  Id. at 107, 115, 124, 142. 
 After those calculations, the court sentenced the 
defendant to 15 months on each count, to be served concurrently 
with each other and concurrently with the undischarged sentence 
on the Colorado charge.  Although the court did not resolve the 
issue of whether 21 or 24 months was the proper combined maximum 
sentence, such a precise determination was unnecessary, given 
that the minimum sentence of 15 months on the instant offenses, 
  
coupled with the 17-month sentence already served, would surpass 
either the 21- or 24-month combined sentence.  The court noted 
its 15-month concurrent sentence was "the lowest possible 
sentence [the defendant] could have received under subsection C 
[of § 5G1.3].  The Court could have gone no lower except had I 
departed and, in fact, I see no circumstances that would have 
warranted departure nor have any been set forth."  Id. at 150-51. 
 We are satisfied that the district court fully followed 
the procedures suggested by § 5G1.3(c).  Although the defendant 
did not receive a "combined sentence of imprisonment that 
approximates the total punishment that would have been imposed 
under § 5G1.2," such a sentence could not have been imposed here 
without a departure from the guidelines.  As we have noted, such 
a departure is not required under § 5G1.3.  See discussion part 
III.A; § 5G1.3 (Commentary). 
 Furthermore, the government points out that this case 
demonstrates the wisdom of leaving discretion in the hands of the 
district court.  When Holifield pled guilty to the Colorado 
charge in August 1993, he chose not to disclose his illegal 
conduct from 1989 to 1992.  Had Holifield come forward with that 
information in Colorado, he could have had all the offenses 
combined.  Thus in this case, the increased total punishment is 
directly a result of a delay in the discovery of the offenses, a 
factor entirely in the control of the defendant. 
 B. 
 Although we find the district court followed the § 
5G1.3(c) methodology, we would reach the same result here even if 
  
the district court had considered but rejected application of 
that methodology.   As we have stated, the commentary to § 5G1.3 
provides:  "To the extent practicable, the court should consider 
a reasonable incremental penalty to be a sentence for the instant 
offense that results in a combined sentence of imprisonment that 
approximates the total punishment that would have been imposed 
under § 5G1.2 . . . ."  (emphasis added). 
 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has noted 
the "should consider" language of the commentary "falls somewhere 
between the 'may consider' language in the 1989 amendment and the 
'shall impose' mandate of the 1991 version."  United States v. 
Redman, 35 F.3d 437, 440-41 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. 
Ct. 922 (1995).  The Ninth Circuit concluded this language means 
that a district court "may decline to impose the sentence 
suggested by the commentary's methodology, if it has a good 
reason for doing so."  Id. at 441. 
 [T]he court must attempt to calculate the 
reasonable incremental punishment that would 
be imposed under the commentary methodology.  
If that calculation is not possible or if the 
court finds that there is a reason not to 
impose the suggested penalty, it may use 
another method to determine what sentence it 
will impose.  The court must, however, state 
its reasons for abandoning the commentary 
methodology in such a way as to allow us to 
see that it has considered the methodology. 
Id.  We agree with this analysis and join the majority of 
circuits that have addressed this question in concluding that 
although the district court must calculate the "reasonable 
incremental punishment" according to the methodology, it need not 
  
impose that penalty.7  Instead, the court may employ a different 
method in determining the sentence as long as it indicates its 
reasons for not employing the commentary methodology. 
 In this case, the district court went through the 
methodology step-by-step with government and defense counsel 
before imposing its sentence.  Furthermore, the court listed 
several factors that warranted a more severe sentence.  The court 
noted the defendant's prior offense "had not been fully taken 
into account" in determining the offense level for the instant 
convictions.  App. at 151-52.  Furthermore, the court stated most 
                     
7
.  See United States v. Wiley-Dunaway, 40 F.3d 67, 71-72 (4th 
Cir. 1994) (citations omitted) (§ 5G1.3 "only requires that the 
district court 'consider' such a sentence 'to the extent 
practicable' to fashion a 'reasonable incremental 
punishment.' . . .  [T]he district court retains the right to 
depart from this suggestion in accordance with the Sentencing 
Guidelines."); United States v. Torrez, 40 F.3d 84, 87 (5th Cir. 
1994) ("[E]ven if the district court had considered this 
provision, it would have been free to decline to follow the 
suggested methodology."); United States v. Coleman, 15 F.3d 610, 
613 (6th Cir. 1994) ("[B]ecause the methodology 'is meant to 
assist the court in determining the appropriate sentence,' it 
will not always be necessary to follow the precise methodology 
called for under § 5G1.3 . . . since there may be circumstances 
which will warrant the court in resorting to a simpler method of 
achieving a result which is the practical equivalent of the more 
complex computations."); United States v. Redman, 35 F.3d 437, 
441 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[I]f the court finds that there is a reason 
not to impose the suggested penalty, it may use another method to 
determine what sentence it will impose."), cert. denied, 115 S. 
Ct. 922 (1995); United States v. Johnson, 40 F.3d 1079, 1084 
(10th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted) ("[C]ourts have recognized 
that 'it will not always be necessary to follow the precise 
methodology called for under § 5G1.3 . . . .'").  But see United 
States v. Duranseau, 26 F.3d 804, 810-11 (8th Cir.) (noting if 
methodology other than that in § 5G1.3 is used, the district 
court must employ a departure analysis), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 
341 (1994). 
  
of the victims were elderly and the financial hardship the 
defendant caused was probably "irremediable."  Id. at 152-53.  
Finally, the court noted the defendant's conduct was "parasitic 
and outrageous" and he had not shown any remorse for his actions.  
Id.  Thus, although the district court properly followed the § 
5G1.3 methodology, we believe it also listed more than sufficient 
reasons for departing from that methodology if it had chosen to 
do so. 
 IV. 
 We hold that the sentencing court properly applied the 
methodology of § 5G1.3, and was within its discretion when it 
chose not to depart from the guideline range of sentencing.  
Furthermore, we conclude that the sentencing court is not bound 
to follow that methodology as long as it indicates the rationale 
for its decision.  For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the 
judgment of conviction and sentence of the district court. 
